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HUMAN RIGHTS, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY,
AND HAITIAN REFUGEES

Haitians have been migrating to the United States in signifi-

cant numbers since the rise to power of Francois Duvalier over a
quarter century ago. A few who have been able to meet the strict

eligibility criteria of U. S. immigration law have entered as legal
immigrants. Perhaps as many as 300,000 others have entered

illegally, or have overstayed the terms of their temporary visas. A
diverse population composed of professionals and businessmen,
students and shopkeepers, journalists, small land holders, and

illiterate peasants, it is impossible to capture their individual
reasons for leaving Haiti and coming to the United States in a
single all-inclusive phrase.
Haiti is the poorest country in this hemisphere. Nearly all who
leave to come to the United States are aware that they are trading
malnutrition, negligible educational opportunities, and a sub-

sistence standard of living for the greater opportunities afforded
by life in America. Haiti is also a country with a tradition of
violence and political repression that is unparalleled in the
Caribbean. The violence is less extreme today than it was in the

darkest days of Francois Duvalier's rule, yet the national security
forces continue to carry on personal vendettas in the countryside,
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and political repression has not abated significantly. Opponents
of the regime of Jean-Claude Duvalier are denied the right to

organize, union activity and political expression are closely
monitored; prison, torture, and exile are used to suppress dissent

(Organization of American States [OAS], 1983; Amnesty, 1983).
Thus many who have left Haiti in the last quarter century-or in

the last five years-well may be "economic migrants," as the State
Department has consistently claimed. Yet others, whose flight

was motivated by personal fear, clearly meet the present American, and long-standing international, definitions of "refugee."
The importance of distinguishing between "economic migrants" and political "refugees" has become clearer since 1980,

though such a distinction has in fact been relevant to Haitian
migrants since the early 1970s. In 1980, growing resistance to
Indochinese refugee flow, concerns about illegal Mexican migration, and the boat lift of some 125,000 Cubans from Mariel
harbor demonstrated that not every alien would be welcomed.
Yet in that year, Congress enacted a new refugee law that, for the
first time, unequivocally guaranteed asylum to any migrant from

any country arriving in United States and able to demonstrate a
personal, "well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or
political opinion."
The present asylum rights of Haitians are more generous than

they have ever been in the past. Yet Haitians have in fact been
claiming asylm or its equivalent in significant numbers since the
early 1970s, and have been especially discriminated against.
Long-standing prejudice and restrictionist fears cannot be ignor-

ed as contributing factors. Yet it is the contention of this article
that the principal reason for the special immigration animus
against Haitians, particularly as it has displayed itself in the
handling of political asylum claims, has been the close political
relationship between the United States and the Duvaliers pere

and fils. We argue that shared anticommunist objectives have
taken priority over human rights concerns since the late 1950s,
and that individual asylum applicants, and the integrity of the
asylum determination process, have been the primary victims of
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that policy. Thus, we intend to show that the denial of virtually
every Haitian claim between 1972 and 1980 reflected conscious
policy choices. More importantly, we will argue that similar

choices continue to affect the processing of Haitian asylum claims
today, despite the provisions of the new refugee act.

Haiti under Francois Duvalier

Haitian migration is not a new phenomenon. Since the late
nineteenth century, Haitians have been working as migrant labor
in agriculture throughout the Caribbean. During the U. S.
occupation of Haiti between 1915 and 1934, hundreds of

thousands of unskilled Haitian laborers were encouraged to
migrate to both Cuba and the Dominican Republic to work in

sugar mills and plantations (Lundahl, 1979: 623-627; Boswell,
1982: 18). These flows were temporarily halted in the 1930s due to

worldwide economic depression and a massacre of Haitians
ordered by the Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo.
Another wave of mass emigration from Haiti was initiated in

the mid 1950s. Economic stagnation and political turmoil,
followed by the consolidation of power by Duvalier, caused

thousands of Haitians to flee to the United States, Canada,
France, Africa, the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and elsewhere in the

Caribbean Basin. From the ouster of the former President Paul E.
Magloire in December 1956, to Duvalier's accession to power, six

provisional regimes had attempted to gain power in Haiti.
Finally, in July 1957, a military junta headed by General Kebreau
took control and set elections for September of that year. Dr.
Duvalier was the favored candidate of the junta and every effort
(including disqualifying candidates and strict censoring of the
media prior to the election) was made to ensure his victory.
Duvalier assumed power in September 1957 in one of the
poorest countries of the world. The country was in dire economic

straits despite attempts by both the IMF and United States to
stabilize the country through special assistance programs (New
York Times, 1957a; 1957b). Conditions worsened during his
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administration and have not improved significantly during the
administration of his son. Haiti has the highest infant mortality

rate, the lowest nutrition standards, and the highest illiteracy rate
in the Western Hemisphere (Inter-American Development Bank,
1958-1980; World Bank, 1981; Lundahl, 1979). A recent World

Bank survey determined that three out of four Haitians live at or
below the absolute poverty level and that per capita income in
many rural areas is less than $100 (1981).
The causes of poverty in Haiti are deep rooted. Most Haitians
live in the countryside and rely on the agricultural sector for their
livelihood. Unfortunately, two-thirds of Haiti consists of steep,

largely eroded mountains that are unsuitable for cultivation.
Demographic concentration in the countryside and a very uneven

land tenure situation have, over time, reduced Haitian agriculture
to a vicious circle of poverty. In addition, Haiti has virtually no
natural resources and possesses only the most rudimentary
infrastructure.

Haitian poverty, however, results not from demographic
pressures, soil erosion, and natural scarcity alone. It also derives
from deliberately maintained patterns of economic inequality
and abuses of political power (Lundahl, 1979: 623-647; Roberts,
1978; Lichtenberg, 1982). According to one scholarly study of the
Haitian economy:
In spite of the compelling fact that agriculture has always
constituted the very backbone of the Haitian economy, the
Haitian governments have traditionally done next to nothing to
improve the lot of the peasants. The gulf between the peasant and

his government is abysmally wide.... Economic development has
never been a political goal in Haiti. Instead, a never-ending stream
of kleptocracies who could think of little else than filling their
pockets have squandered the available funds in their attempts to
gain or retain the presidency [Lundahl, 1979: 636; U. S. AID,

1977: 143].'
The presidencies of Francois and Jean Claude Duvalier have
proven to be no exception to this historical pattern of rule. The
Haitian government continues to control tightly every aspect of
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the collection of revenues and expenditures, and there have been

continual reports of government curruption and mismanagement
of funds. Thus, a 1979 World Bank report revealed that in 1977
almost 40% of all expenditures and revenues were channeled
through special checking accounts held at the National Bank,

making it virtually impossible to determine their source or
eventual disposition (World Bank, 1981). In 1978, the Congressional Research Service estimated that 50% of Haiti's income was

in unbudgeted accounts that were presumed to end up in private
hands (Roberts, 1978). In its 1979 report on human rights in
Haiti, the U. S. State Department concluded: "Corruption is
traditional at all levels of society, and significant amounts of
domestic revenues usable for development continue to be diverted to personal enrichment (U. S. State Department, 1980: 344)."
Even the money that Haiti does devote to legitimate government
expenditures has little effect on easing economic and social

inequalities. The Haitian government devotes less domestic
revenue per capita than any other country in the hemisphere to
such social necessities as public education, public health, or

agricultural extension services (Lundahl, 1979: 641).
Once in power, Francois Duvalier ruthlessly purged the
country of all real and suspected opposition. He systematically

reduced the political role of the army, dismissed successive
commanders-in-chief and a large number of professional officers
of all ranks, and closed the military academy (Heinl and Heinl,
1978). Duvalier, in turn, created a paramilitary force, called the
tonton macoutes, later combined into the Service Volontaire

Militaire, who were directly responsible to the president and
would obey his orders without question or scruple. The majority
of tonton macoutes have been unpaid and therefore have had to
earn their livelihood by extorting money and property with
threats of violence against their fellow Haitians.
The political opposition to Duvalier was dealt with through
these personal instruments of state terror. In probably the first

widespread use of "disappearances" in the Western Hemisphere,
Duvalier's paramilitary forces wielded wide discretionary power
to arrest, imprison, torture, and put to death any Haitian citizen
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without even an order in writing. Opponents of the regime or

those merely under suspicion disappeared without trace (International Commission of Jurists, 1963: 19-25; 1966: 1-5; 1967: 28-33;

Heinl, and Heinl, 1978; Rotberg, 1971; Deiderich and Burt, 1969;
Manigat, 1964). The disappeared came from all ranks, including
labor union representatives, professors and students, lawyers
who defended critics of the regime, peasants suspected of
harboring "subversives," and people abducted out of personal

caprice of the tonton macoutes. Duvalier's agents directed their

terror not only against their perceived enemies, but against the
relatives of their enemies as well. Sometimes whole families were

exterminated in political reprisals. The victims were completely
without access to lawyers and Duvalier rejected proposals by the
Inter-American Human Rights Commission and the Interna-

tional Commission of Jurists to make on-site visits.
All other potential opposition was likewise crushed. The

National Union of Haitian Workers, which was the largest
association of labor unions, was disbanded. The government used
coercion to enforce press censorship. The Catholic churh was

silenced as a political force through expulsion of its leadership.
The legislative and judicial branches delegated all their effective

authority to the president who ruled the country for most of his
tenure under a state of emergency. The government deliberately
ignored individual freedoms, and hundreds of political prisoners
were taken and held at Fort Dimanche, the notorious "death
prison." Numerous organizations protested human rights violations there (New York Times, 1958h; 1958g; 1958f; 1958e; 1958d;

1958a; 1959a) and the International Commission of Jurists
termed Haiti a country in which every single article and paragraph
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was being
systematically violated (International Commission of Jurists,
1967: 28).

The Flight of Refugees
Under such circumstances, the flow of persons fleeing Haiti to
ensure their personal safety increased dramatically, and the
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United States was the preferred choice for most Haitian emigrants. The first wave consisted principally of former government
officials and politicans, professionals, businessmen, and other

urban or middle-class persons, many of whom were either fleeing
the tyranny of Duvalier or had no economic mobility in the new
political order. Those wishing to leave Haiti were required to

purchase a passport and exit visa, compulsory travel insurance,
and to pay exit and other taxes. Most lower-class Haitians who
could not afford the cost of exit documents and airfare to the U.S.

left Haiti illegally and sailed to the Bahamas where immigration
laws were not strictly enforced against them.
The Haitian government made little effort to curb this outflow,
as the export of large numbers of potential dissidents and

disaffected persons contributed to the maintenance of the Duvalier regime. Moreover, the property of dissidents was seized by

Duvalier's security forces, and emigrant remittances became an
important source of revenue, particularly as Haiti became
increasingly isolated from the international community in the
1960s (Segal, 1975: 197-204).

Almost all Haitians who entered the U.S. arrived by air with
some type of visa. The majority of those with nonimmigrant visas
simply overstayed and remained illegally. Perhaps because these
Haitians were generally well-educated and reasonably well-to-do,

the U.S. Immigration Service (INS) took a laissez-faire attitude
toward them, did not actively pursue those who remained
illegally, and rarely deported them. If Haitians claimed political
refugee status, the INS ordinarily placed them under "docket
control," in effect failing to enforce orders of deportation while
granting work authorization, yet denying all opportunity to
obtain "permanent residence" status (Dominguez, 1975: 31). This
treatment was similar to that initially afforded hundreds of
Cubans who arrived in the United States- without visas during the
first years of the Castro regime. However, subsequent steps to

relax immigration rules for Cubans, including the practice of
waiving the visa requirement altogether, and the passage of
Public Law 762, in 1966 to grant earlier arrivals "permanent
resident" status were not taken for the Haitians.
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Most Haitians settled in New York City where industrial and
service employment was readily available, with lesser numbers
going to Boston, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., and Miami. In
contrast with the Cubans, for whom a special federal program
was created during the last months of the Eisenhower administration (Moore, 1980),2 the Haitians received no U.S. federal or state
assistance, and little aid was given by private organizations.
The major exile leaders sought unsuccessfully to organize

politically and to raise funds for arms in order to overthrow

Duvalier by invasion and intrigue from without. Despite the
formation of umbrella organizations among rival exile groups,
the opposition forces outside Haiti remained small and divided.
Exile leaders were scattered throughout the Western Hemisphere

in New York, Miami, Montreal, San Juan, Santo Domingo, and

Havana-and were basically antagonistic to one other.

U.S. Foreign Policy Interests
Although the Eisenhower administration was willing to allow

Haitians to remain in the U.S. outside of regular immigration
procedures, it was clearly unwilling to maintain anything but a

distant relationship with the exile leaders. Unlike the Cuban
exiles whom the U.S. government utilized in fomenting aggression

against Castro, the U.S. was not interested in surreptitiously

sponsoring an armed incursion by exiled Haitians. Francois
Duvalier quickly gained U.S. support after his accession to power
in 1957 and the Eisenhower administration remained closely
aligned to him in succeeding years. Responding to an unsuccessful
Florida-based exile attempt to overthrow Duvalier on July 29,
1958, Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter advised President Eisenhower:
I recommend that you agree to receive the Foreign Minister of
Haiti, Dr. Louis Mars, ... so that he may deliver a message to you
from Haitian President Francois Duvalier. The message request
United States military assistance to help Haiti defend itself from
armed attacks it fears will be made on it in the near future....

Since the principal opponents of the Haitian Government are now
in exile in the United States and because a recent revolutionary
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attempt was apparently launched from United States soil, I believe
that it is highly desirable that you receive the Foreign Minister in
order to dispel any impression that we countenance the organization of revolutionary expeditions in the United States against Dr.
Duvalier's government [Herter, 1958].

Throughout the Eisenhower administration, the U.S. ignored
Duvalier's elimination of his rivals and the violation of human
rights in Haiti. The New York Times (1958c; 1958b), acknowl-

edging that his methods were brutal, gave Duvalier its support,
calling him "a man of principle with a desire to pacify his
country."

Strategically situated between the Atlantic Ocean and Carib-

bean Sea, Haiti has long been regarded as within the sphere of
American influence. Prior to World War II, influence was exerted
through direct military intervention (Schmidt, 1971). After the
war, it was exerted through economic and, as time progressed,
direct military aid. Economic aid began in 1946, and the U.S.
provided about $120 million in economic assistance between 1946

and 1972 (Weil, 1973: 124, 145-146). Under the 1951 Military
Security Act, the U.S. extended Haiti $4.5 million in military aid
from 1950 to 1963, after which the program was discontinued
until 1970 (Weil, 1973). Bilateral military assistance agreements
were first entered into in 1955. In return, Haiti supported
American positions in the United Nations and the OAS.

With the triumph of Fidel Castro in Cuba in January 1959,
Cuba became the site of the first Marxist-Leninist revolution in
the Americas and a source of chronic concern in the U.S. The
U.S. was particularly concerned that Cuba, in its general desire to
export revolution in the region, might use Haitian exiles to
organize and support a movement to overthrow the Duvalier
regime (U.S. Department of State, 1960: 340-341). Indeed the
most active exile activity at the time originated in Cuba, where
Castro made available to Haitian exiles a radio station and
logistical support for invasions of Haiti, which proved abortive.
Charging that the commuist menace emanating from Cuba
threatened the security of his country, Duvalier took a firm
anticommunist posture in foreign affairs and stressed his loyalty
to the U.S. Duvalier also made repeated offers of military

cooperation, including a naval base in Haiti, sites suitable for
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amphibious training of U.S. forces, sites for U.S. missle installations and for U.S. missle tracking stations (Duvalier, 1959).3 By
early 1959, the U.S. officially announced its decision to shore up

the Haitian government with a major new economic aid program.
It was the view of the State Department then that Duvalier "had

given more stability to Haiti than any exile coalition would" and
his overthrow might plunge Haiti into chaos (New York Times,
1959b).

Duvalier used the American military presence, in particular, as
a way to buttress his own regime and to immobilize effectively the
activities of anti-Duvalier opposition outside Haiti. The frequent

port calls of the U.S. fleet at Port-au-Prince, and the arrival in
early 1959 of a U.S. Marine Mission to train the Haitian army,
were visible demonstrations of American support. In addition,
the U.S. began supplying equipment for the modernization of
Haiti's military establishment and underwrote a major portion of

the budget deficit, including $11 million in 1960 and $13.5 million
in 1961, slightly less than half of Haiti's public expenditures for
the year (Rotberg, 1971: 236). According to a State Department
official in 1961, the U.S. had "no other alternative (than Duvalier)
and ought to try to elevate the standard of living for the people
and raise their level of civilization" (Hispanic American Report,
1961: 607).

The Kennedy Administration and
the Isolation of Duvalier
The inauguration of President John F. Kennedy brought about

a shift of emphasis in U.S. policy toward Latin America.
American policy, in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs, sought to
improve the economic and social welfare of the people in the
Western Hemisphere and to defend democratic institutions
against the Cuban threat (Martin, 1963: 711). Human rights
conditions inside Haiti grew so horrendous and Duvalier's
attitude toward other states became so antagonistic that Kennedy

This content downloaded from 156.56.168.2 on Fri, 29 Apr 2016 15:21:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Loescher, Scanlan / RIGHTS, POLICY, AND HAITIAN REFUGEES 323

no longer wanted to be identified with him. The watershed event

in U.S.-Haitian relations was the fraudulent reelection in May
1961, of Francois Duvalier as President, by the margin of

1,320,780 to 0, before his term of office had expired and in open
breach of the 1957 constitution, for a further six-year term
beginning on May 15, 1963. Thereafter, U.S.-Haitian relations

deteriorated rapidly. U.S. Ambassador Robert Newbegin was
recalled to Washington and purposely absented himself when

Duvalier was inagurated as president for his second term of office

(Heinl, and Heinl, 1978).4 When Newbegin returned to Haiti,
U.S. relations were conducted on a "cool but correct" basis.
Although the U.S. publicly maintained that there continued to
be no viable alternative to Duvalier, the Kennedy administration

tried to develop that alternative by channelling financial assistance to Haitian opposition figures such as Magloire. Such aid
was meant to convey the message to Duvalier that there were
limits to American tolerance of his regime. While Kennedy

wished to remove Duvalier or bring about radical improvements
in his methods of rule, he feared creating a "second Cuba" in the
Western hemisphere. Hoping to ensure a stable, friendly govern-

ment as a successor to Duvalier, the Kennedy administration, in
the words of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "used persuasion, aid,
pressure and almost all techniques short of the landing of outside
forces" to bring about changes in Haiti (Heinl, and Heinl, 1978:

622).
Haitian exiles willing to undertake military action were not in
the vanguard of American policy toward Haiti, but they did play
a role. After the abortive CIA-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion in
April 1961, the U.S. was reluctant to support any large-scale

military enterprises in the hemisphere; yet the CIA extended its
efforts beyond Cuba to support covert activities in other nations

of the Latin American periphery. Not surprisingly, the CIA and
the Special Operations Branch of the State Department continued
to have an interest in Haitian affairs into the 1980s. Included were
several attempts to arm and support exile invasions of Haiti to
overthrow Duvalier. Haitian groups received secret U.S. government funds and there were ties between U.S. intelligence agencies
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and the exile groups that invaded Haiti in 1963 (New York Times,

1975a; 1975b).5
The U.S. also threatened to cut off economic aid, but Duvalier
successfully used his leverage at the Organization of American

States to delay and frustrate the employment of economic
sanctions. At the OAS's Eighth Meeting of Consultation of
Foreign Ministers at Punta del Este, in January 1962, Haiti found

itself in the position of casting the decisive vote on the expulsion
of Cuba from the OAS, and it used this vote to gain additional

U.S. economic aid to build a jet airport and a hospital (Schlesinger, 1965: 782-783). Some $ 10 million in additional Agency for

International Development (AID) funds were also pledged. Most
American aid was suspended again in July 1962, because of
growing concern over Haitian governmental corruption, rapidly
accumulating human rights violations, and the total official
indifference to the plight of Haitian citizenry. Again political

maneuvering, rather than improvement in conditions, blunted
the force of U.S. disapproval. During the Cuban Missile Crisis of
October 1962, Duvalier placed Haiti's harbors and air fields at the

disposal of U.S. forces carrying out the military quarantine of
Cuba. Subsequently some aid was restored, in particular U.S.
support in the construction of the jet airport, one of Duvalier's pet
projects.
Nevertheless, the Kennedy administration's relationship with
Haiti grew progressively worse. The deterioration in relations

climaxed in 1963, when Haiti's forcible entry and occupation of
the Dominican Embassy in Port-au-Prince precipitated a major

regional crisis. Maximum pressure, short of military intervention,
was employed to prevent Duvalier from continuing. At the height

of the crisis, Under-Secretary of State George Ball described the
Duvalier regime as "falling apart and in a kind of progressive
disintegration" (New York Times, 1963). When Duvalier resisted
American pressure to step down at the end of this original six-

year term in May 1963, the Kennedy administration cut off
economic aid, suspended diplomatic relations for a month in
protest, and evacuated all American citizens from Haiti. Military
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assistance was suspended as well, and the mission chief and
military missions were expelled from Haiti. In August 1963, a
force of Haitian exiles under General Leon Cantave invaded
Haiti, but the invasion failed and was defeated. Despite considerable anti-Duvalier propaganda, a show of military force,
manipulation of grants-in-aid, and diplomatic pressure, the
Haitian regime maintained itself in power.
The Johnson Administration and the
Near Normalization of U. S.-Haitian Relations

U.S. ostracism of Haiti was short lived. With the accession to
power of President Lyndon Johnson, the policy of economic and
diplomatic sanctions against Haiti was moderated and the U.S.
developed a less critical stance toward Duvalier. A new U.S.

ambassador was appointed, and the U.S. representative to the
Inter-American Development Bank, reversing an earlier veto,
approved a $2.4 million loan to Haiti. Despite a blistering critique
of human rights conditions in Haiti by the International Commission of Jurists and Haitian plans to revise their constitution to
proclaim Duvalier "president for life," Ambassador Benson
Timmons attended celebrations marking the second anniversary
of Duvalier's self-appointed presidency, thus officially linking the
U.S. with the ruling regime.

The rationale for this shift in policy was clear. The U. S.
continued to find Haiti's support at the OAS extremely useful. In
July 1964, Haiti voted along with the U. S. to impose OAS
sanctions against Cuba. With the advent of the Dominican crisis
in April 1965, Haiti's vote in the OAS was again crucial for U. S.
interests. Despite considerable opposition among Latin American states to creating an Inter-American Peace Force to legitimize
American intervention in the Dominican Republic, Haiti contributed to the bare two-thirds majority vote needed to pass the
OAS resolution. There was also a sense among policymakers

that, although Haiti was perhaps the most repressive nation in
Latin America, it was also the poorest. Therefore, efforts to
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promote respect for human rights were perceived to be fruitless

and counter-productive, at least until development had progressed significantly.
By 1966 the U. S. was once again giving Haiti considerable

indirect support and encouraging the resumption of private
investment and tourism. Haiti successfully solicited further loans
from the Inter-American Development Bank (with U. S. acquiescence) and received aid from the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) and voluntary agencies that distributed AID

funds quietly. The U.S. Navy resumed making port calls in Haiti,
and there were reports of aircraft and other arms being smuggled
from the U.S. to Haiti without benefit of U.S. export licenses
(Hispanic American Report, 1964a: 804-805).

Of perhaps greater importance to Duvalier, the U. S. adopted
measures to prevent U. S. territory from being used as a base by

Haitian exiles. Radio jamming equipment was provided to Haiti
to counter the broadcasts of anti-Duvalier exiles, and a vigorous
law enforcement effort was initiated to stop exile activitiesorganization, training, fundraising, or launching attacks-based
in the U. S. and aimed at Haiti. On several occasions in 1967,
1968, and 1969, American officials arrested groups of Haitian

exiles training in Florida, seized large arms caches, and indicted

their leaders for planning to invade Haiti and to export arms
illegally (New York Times, 1967; 1968a; 1968b; 1969a; 1969b;
1970). In contrast, although CIA on-the-record financing of

Cuban exile activities was terminated in May 1963, circumstantial evidence suggests that radical anti-Castro Cubans
continued to receive secret U. S. government aid for at least
another decade or more (Scanlan and Loescher, 1983: 116-137).

The New Haitian Exodus

These actions served to consolidate Duvalier's hold on Haiti,
which by the mid-1960s had become one of the most repressive
countries in the world (International Commission of Jurists,
1963). More and more Haitians joined the large number of exiles
abroad. However, unlike the earlier groups, this new flow
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included urban skilled and semiskilled workers and even a few
peasants who had borrowed, or whose relatives provided, the cost
of a visa and a ticket. Composed in part of migrants with less hope

of returning to Haiti, and containing more individuals whose

grievances were based on the general misery of life in Haiti, rather
than on a coherent program of opposition to the Duvalier regime

or on personal histories of persecution, not all of the new arrivals
would have qualified as "refugees" under prevailing standards of
international law. Nevertheless, their motives for departure were
at least as political as their Cuban counterparts, who entered the

country by the thousands in the U. S. sponsored "freedom flights"
that began in 1965 and continued into 1973. No similar departure
program was ever establised for the Haitians. Those who could
not afford the cost of exit documents and air fare to New York or

who had to flee quickly continued to cross the border illegally to

the Dominican Republic (Hispanic American Report 1964b:
1061)6 or to sail to the Bahamas where they would stay without

legal admittance or work permits. Although many found work in
the Bahamas, Haitian emigrants lived in constant fear of being
discovered by the police and being thrown into prison before
being deported back to Haiti (Boswell, 1982: 18-19).
In the early 1970s, a major new stream of Haitians-the boat
people-began arriving in the United States. The first known

boat load of Haitians landed on Florida's coast in 1963. They
requested political asylum, were denied it by the INS, and were

returned to Haiti. Beginning in late 1972, a virtually continuous
flow of boats with Haitians seeking political asylum began to land
in South Florida. In contrast to previous flows to the U. S. greater

numbers of those arriving were poor, uneducated, and of rural
origin (Boswell, 1983: 61-62). There were several reasons for this
shift in the character of flow. Among them were a crackdown on
the Haitians in the Bahamas; more restrictive policies governing
the grant of nonimmigrant visas, coupled with vigorous INS
enforcement of immigration laws; and an interest by Haitian local
authorities in financial gains in continued illegal emigration.
Haiti was also feeling the effect of a decade of international

isolation and political turmoil and violence. The flight out of
Haiti by professionals and technicians during the 1960s had had a
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catastrophic effect on the economy. In addition, the countryside
suffered from years of governmental neglect and corruption. One
major result was the start-up of an out-migration of large
numbers of the rural sector of the Haitian population, particularly those from northern Haiti, the poorest region of the country.
Moreover, under Jean-Claude Duvalier, the security forces
expanded their activities in rural areas and expropriated large
areas of scarce fertile land. This pattern of corruption affected the
country's rural population particularly harshly (Maguire, 1981:

9). 7Also in the mid 1970s, the INS began to curtail its granting of
legal entry to Haitians in Port-au-Prince who wanted to visit the
U. S. temporarily. Haitians were required to demonstrate ties that
would ensure a return to Haiti such as bank accounts, ownership

of land, a job, and a round-trip air ticket. The effect of this
enforcement was to reduce immigration by air to the U.S. and to

increase illegal immigration by boat to Florida. In addition, a
large-scale smuggling industry developed with official con-

nivance. By the late 1970s, Haitians were transported in large
numbers aboard freighters to Florida while others continued to
come via small boats.

For these reasons, larger numbers of Haitians began arriving
on the Florida coast in late 1972. An estimated 3,500 Haitians

arrived between 1972 and 1977 (Lawyers Committee, 1978: 3).
Many of them were able to find work and remain undetected. In
the meantime, to the consternation of U. S. officials, a migration
network was quickly being established. As more Haitians relocated in Florida and communicated their success back home,

larger numbers of Haitians were encouraged to depart for Miami.

U. S.-Haitian Relations Under

The Nixon Administration
Along with this flow of new Haitians to the U. S. there occurred
an important shift in American foreign policy toward Duvalier

under the Nixon administration. Governor Nelson Rockefeller,
as special envoy for President Nixon, visited Port-au-Prince in
July 1969. while in Haiti, Rockefeller delivered a personal letter
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from Nixon to Duvalier, and members of his party publicly

expressed hope for the resumption of direct U. S. aid to Haiti
(New York Times, 1969c). Shortly thereafter U. S. Ambassador
Clinton Knox recommended the renewal of aid. Spurred on by U.
S. interest, the Inter-American Development Bank loaned over
$5 million to improve the water system of Port-au-Prince and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a new stand-by
credit. In 1970, the Nixon administration lifted the ban imposed
by President Kennedy on the sale of arms to Haiti, and the

Department of State authorized over $1 million in private arms
sales in 1971.

These activities picked up after the accession to power of
Jean-Claude Duvalier in April 1971. In a visible demonstration of

American support for the regime, the U. S. fleet was sent to ply
Haitian waters to prevent any attempted landing by Haitian
exiles. A private arms company based in Miami was engaged to
train the Leopards, an elite counter-insurgency force that served
as a personal bodyguard to the new president. In March of 1972, a

Haitian delegation visited the Departments of State and Defense
in Washington, D. C., and in July a U. S. survey team travelled to
Haiti to assess that country's request for military assistance. An
economic assistance program was established by year's end, after
nearly a ten-year absence.

These actions were consistent with the broad views of Nixon
and Kissinger, who believed that the importance of protecting the
transit of shipping through the Windward Passage, the fear of a

Castro-type government coming to power in Haiti, an on-going
campaign to keep allies in the OAS who would maintain

opposition to normalized relations with Cuba, and the U. S.
interest in safeguarding its commercial and Political interests in
the neighboring Dominican Republic all overrode American

concerns about human rights violations in Haiti.

Human Rights Under
Jean-Claude Duvalier

Accompanying this shift in official relations was a concerted
effort on the part of the U. S. and Haiti to portray the
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administration of "Baby Doc" as being significantly less repressive and more benign than had been the rule of "Papa Doc." It

was the opinion of several major human rights organizations,
however, that while the most flagrant forms of repression were

toned down under the new regime, widespread human rights
violations continued. A report in 1973 by Amnesty International
noted:
Haiti's prisons are still filled with people who have spent many
years in detention without ever being charged or brought to trial.

Amnesty International remains seriously concerned with the
continued repression of dissent in Haiti and the denial of human
and legal rights .... The variety of torture to which the detainee is

subjected is incredible: clubbing to death, maiming of the genitals,
food deprivation to the point of starvation, and the insertion of
red-hot pokers into the back passage.... In fact, these prisons are
death traps. . . [and] find a parallel with the Nazi concentration

camps of the past but have no present-day equivalent.

Senator Edward Brooke, in a report to the Senate Appro-

priations Committee in 1974, concluded that although "the grim
visible terror of Francois Duvalier's regime may have subsided, it
seems that autocratic rule characterized by an unflinching

willingness to suppress people has not" (U.S. Congress, Senate
Appropriations, 1974). The (OAS) condemned the "very serious

violation of the right to liberty and personal security" by the

Haitian government (OAS, 1973). The AFL-CIO News reported
the testimony of its legislative representative, Howard McGaigan,
before the Senate Appropriations Committee: "The AFL-CIO
witness stressed that the dictatorship in Haiti has not become

significantly less oppressive with Jean-Claude Duvalier. Midnight
arrests, secret police and absolute suppression of all freedoms still
are the tools of Haiti's rulers" (AFL-CIO News, 1974). By 1975,
Amnesty International saw little or no improvement in the

Haitian government's treatment of its citizens: "Arrests are
carried out without warrants and often take the form of

disappearances of kidnapping. . . Prisoners are not allowed
lawywers, nor contact with their families on arrest nor-with few
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exceptions-are they charged or brought to trial" (Amnesty,
1975-1976).

Thus, during the Nixon and Ford administrations, Haitians
continued to flee a regime that was not only impoverished, but

remained extremely repressive. The numbers of those entering the
U. S. remained fairly constant; yet from 1973 on, an increasing
percentage came by boat and eventually sought political asylum.

The Denial of Asylum
The U.S. response to these boat people-with one notable
exception-was predictable and negative. That exception occurred in 1970, when a boat load of Haitian Coastguardsmen who
had shelled the Presidential Palace in Port-au-Prince were
granted asylum. By 1973, however, a policy of denying refugee
status to all Haitian applicants was firmly in place. The denial of
asylum to arriving Haitians was buttressed by a series of

reinforcing practices detention, and the requirement of bond,

and the denial of work authorization and due process (Zucker,
1983: 151-162). The standard operating practice at that time was
to detain apprehended Haitians in state and local penal institutions pending voluntary return to Haiti. They could be released
provided a $500 bond was posted, but they were denied work
authorizations. The Miami District Director of the INS explained, "We feel that any relaxation of the rules could produce a
flood of economic refugees from all over the Carribean" (New
York Times, 1976).
Thus, it was the INS position that the Haitians, mostly rural in

origin, illiterate, and only semiskilled, were simply illegal migrants from an underdeveloped country and not definitionally
refugees. The INS position was summarized by the following
statement of then INS Commissioner Leonard Chapman: "Unlike other large alien nationality groups which have fled sudden

and intolerable political changes in their respective countriesfor example, Hungary, Cuba, and Vietnam-almost all of the
Haitian claimants seek to enter the United States or to remain

here for the purpose of obtaining employment" (U. S. Congress,
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1976: 1). Absent from Commissioner Chapman's statement were

two necessary qualifications. First, many of the Cubans and other
immigrants who had been admitted to the United States as

refugees had not in fact fled "sudden and intolerable political
changes." For example, the 270,000 Cubans who arrived in

Florida between 1965 and 1973 on daily "Freedom Flights" were
not fleeing a sudden political emergency, but in fact were

admitted under a program designed to promote family reunification. The sharp distinction between immigrants and refugees
that the Commissioner used to justify Haitian exclusion thus was
not nearly as precise as he claimed. Second, however plausible the
argument that most Haitians entering the United States were
apolitical and motivated exclusively by economic concerns, that

argument was essentially circular since ultimately reference to it
depended for proof, not on a close examination of particular
cases, but on statistics generated by an administrative process
that had been designed to ignore allegations of human rights
abuse and to prove that no Haitians taking advantage of it were
worthy of asylym.
The full dimensions of the abuse of the asylum system as it has
been applied to Haitians did become apparent until the question
was extensively litigated in the late 1970s. Yet civil rights groups

and churches challenged the treatment afforded Haitians during
the Nixon and Ford administrations, and Congressional hearings
held in response during 1975 and 1976 (U. S. House Subcomm.
On International Organizations, 1976) revealed a consistent
pattern of conduct on the part of both the INS and the

Department of State designed to defeat most Haitian claims.
Unlike the occasional Cubans who continued to arrive by boat
during this period and were seldom, if ever, threatened with
return, arriving Haitians were immediately processed for exclusion or deportation. In order to avoid being returned to Haiti,

they were required to demonstrate that they were in fact refugees
as that term is defined in the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status for Refugees, that is, persons with "a well-founded fear of
persecution" by reason of race, religion, political affiliation, or
membership in a persecuted group (Convention, 1951). Such a

showing was required under the 1975 Code of Federal Regula-
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tions, although prior to 1980, even those who proved probable
persecution were not always entitled to asylum. Under both U. S.

and international legal standards, the burden of demonstrating
refugee status lay then (as it does now) on the refugee. Interna-

tional authorities recognized, however, that an asylum applicant
arriving frightened and without documents often has a difficult
case to make. They therefore recommended administrative
procedures designed to evaluate carefully an applicant's story for
credibility and to give the applicant "the benefit of the doubt"
when his or her story seemed credible. U. S. procedures were

tailored to produce neither careful evaluations nor any favorable

reaction to troublesome claims. Instead the hearings showed that
incoming Haitians were given only, on average, a twenty-minute
interview by the INS, of which five-minutes were spent on

political issues, to prove their case through an interpreter.
Because of the language barrier and the cursory nature of the
initial INS interviews, many Haitian advocates contended that

Haitians were not given any real opportunity to present their
legitimate claims for political asylum. Adding to the difficulties
posed by assembly-line processing and a severe language barrier
was the fact that the INS agents processing Haitians' claims had
received no training of any kind either in asylum law or with
respect to human rights conditions in Haiti. Rather than attempt-

ing to overcome these procedural deficiences, the INS intensified
them by effectively denying almost all Haitian applicants a legal
counsel, and sometimes by moving them hundreds of miles from
their place of apprehension before granting them unpublicized
and speedily arranged asylum interviews.
These hearings also revealed the primary role of the Depart-

ment of State in the asylum decision process. Although it has

always been entrusted with the duty of evaluating individual
asylum claims, prior to 1980 the INS was required to seek an
"advisory opinion" from the State Department on doubtful cases
and on those that the INS considered to be without substance

(U.S. Congress, House, 1976: 3). Because the State Department
has access to considerable information about human rights con-

ditions abroad, they have at least a general knowledge of patterns
of persecution in particular countries. Yet, as these hearings
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revealed, the INS often sent only a summary of the initial

interview to the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs (ORM)
at the State Department where- political asylum claims were
supposed to be reviewed individually by asylum officers. An

ORM study of a claim was based on the applicant's file, and the
applicants themselves were never personally examined by the
ORM.- The asylum officers had no standardized guidelines for

applying the definition of refugee to particular claims. In general,
the applicant for asylum was required to demonstrate that,
because of activities or organizational affiliations and due to

political conditions inside Haiti, persecution would likely result if
he or she were returned home. Before issuing an advisory opinion
to the INS, the applicant's claim was passed through ORM to the

Haitian desk officer for review. In pratically every case, the
decision of the desk officer was then-and still remains-crucial.
The determinations themselves were often based on the assumption that Haitian asylum claims were not valid. Testifying before
the House Subcommittee on International Organizations, Wil-

liam Luers, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs stated:
The great majority of Haitians who are illegally in.the United
States say, when first apprehended, that they have come to the
United, States to seek employment. In very few instances are they
able to demonstrate that they have been or will be persecuted by
their government. Frequently they claim that they will be punished
on return to Haiti simply because they left their country without
permission; but the evidence available to us does not support such
claims. In cases such as these, it is not possible under present laws
and regulations to conclude that they are other than illegal
immigrants, subject to exclusion or deportation proceedings like
similar illegal immigrants from nations throughout the world
[U.S. Congress House, 1975: 4].

In very few instances were cases ever referred to the U. S.
Embassy in Port-au-Prince for further verification or investiga-

tion, nor was much effort expended to monitor returnees. Indeed
a report by a House Subcommittee confirmed that the Embassy

had no guidelines for review of such asylum claims and did not
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have enough personnel to carry through this kind of effort (U. S.

Congress, House, 1976). Furthermore, in making broad recommendations based on conditions in particular countries, the Department
of State tended to emphasize its primary commitment to furthering American foreign policy objectives and maintaining good
relations with allies, thus minimizing humanitarian concerns. The

decisions actually reached by the Department of State almost
always reflected Cold War priorities and reluctance to pass

judgement on the internal conditions of any allied country. This
attitude had already displayed itself in the State Department

decision not to admit any of the thousands of Chileans who fled
the widespread repression in their country after the military coup
of September 1973 (U. S. Congress, Senate, 1974; Hanson, 1978:

107-141). In the case of Haitians, denial of asylum was generally
recommended in blanket fashion and without any meaningful
review of individual applications.

The National Council of Churches challenged INSs procedures
and policies and sued on behalf of the Haitians. The 1977 suit,
Gannon v. United States, asked that the INS end its practice of
denying hearings to Haitians under order of exclusion while
granting hearings for those facing deportation. It also asked that
the Haitians be released from detention without bond and be

given work authorization. In July 1976, while legal actions were
still underway, the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law supported the position of the
National Council of Churches, and recommended that the INS
develop uniform procedures for exclusion and deportation
proceedings, and that it work closely with voluntary agencies to
supervise the release of detained Haitians. It also recommended
that State Department advisory opinions be more detailed and
respond to specific allegations of individual claimants rather than

make broad recommendations based on general conditions in
Haiti. In particular, the Committee report encouraged that every

effort be made to check on questionable cases and to monitor
those persons who had been denied asylum and returned to Haiti
(U.S. Congress, House, 1976: 13-15)
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The Carter Administration
and Human Rights

When the Carter administration came to power, it attempted to
incorporate human rights concerns into American foreign policymaking. The new administration did play an important role in

furthering human rights in Latin America, (Schoultz, 1981) and
took a number of human rights initiatives in regard to Haiti. As

part of an overall reduction of military aid to the region, Haiti was
dropped from the list of Foreign Military Sales recipients but
kept its International Military Education and Training program.

On a visit to Haiti in August 1977, Andrew Young, the U. S.
Ambassador to the United Nations, expressed the Carter adminis-

tration's desire to end support for regimes that violated human

rights and favored the exploitation of the poor by the rich.
Arguing that improvement in the human rights situation would
have a direct effect on the aid and cooperation Haiti recieved

from the U.S., Young said, "When people understand the way the
winds are blowing and if they want to go with those winds, they
trim their sails accordingly" (Washington Post, 1977: Al, A12).
In an attempt to placate the Carter adminsitration, the Haitian
government took a series of steps to improve its human rights

image in the U. S. These included the hiring of the American law
firm of Peabody, Rivlin, Lambert, and Meyers to influence U. S.
policymakers in the Department of State, AID, the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation, the House Committee on
International Relations, and the Senate Committee on Foreign

Relations; contracting the public relations firm of Edelman
International to reform its image in the U. S. (Schoultz, 1981: 64);

the partial relaxation of official repression during 1977 and 1978;
the largest general amnesty of political prisoners in decades; and
the invitation to the Inter-American Human Rights Commission
(IAHRC) to visit Haiti in July 1978.

Although human rights conditions in Haiti improved somewhat during 1977 and 1978, structural barriers to human rights
protection continued to exist (U. S. Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 1977). According to the Department of State, brutality
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"verging on torture" had been employed "'both as punishment for
minor criminal infractions, to extract confessions, and to impose
discipline in prison" (U.S. State Department 1978: 172-176). The
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which visited
Haiti in August 1978, and published its findings in 1980,
concluded that there continued to be a breakdown in the rule of
law; there was no effective or independent judiciary; few legal
safeguards existed to protect people who fell out of favor with the
government (IAHRC, 1980). Practically nothing was done to

develop institutional structures through which these basic violations could be ended.

The Carter Administration and
The Admission of Haitians
Despite the Carter administration's specific emphasis on

human rights, it did not develop an immigration policy toward
Haiti that was free from contradiction. By the mid 1970s, the flow

of Haitians to the U. S. was seen to be less "manageable" than
earlier flows and there was a growing fear among American
policymakers and the public that instability and oppression in the

Third World would give rise to a sustained, and possibly
increased, flow of poor and relatively unskilled people who were
less assimilable into the domestic labor market. In addition, there
were no strong foreign policy reasons to accept large numbers of

Haitians as refugees. It was feared that offers of easy asylum

would send mixed messages to Haiti and could be interpreted as
an unfriendly act and support for a Haitian exile movement, and
would only encourage an out-migration from Haiti. On Septem-

ber 6, 1977, the State Department announced that it had returned
to Haiti 97 refugees who had sailed into the U. S. naval base at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, a month earlier. According to a State
Department representative: "To grant them political asylum...
poses a problem of relations between the United States and the

Haitian government, and to admit them as refugees from
deteriorating economic conditions might encourage still more to
flee" (New York Times, 1977).
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In November 1977, after a long legal action that reached the
Supreme Court and after numerous protests and a broad public
campaign, INS Commissioner Leonel F. Castillo acceded to the
demands of the National Council of Churches to release imprisoned Haitians without bond, to authorize their employment, and to
change INS regualtions so as to allow "excludable" Haitians a
hearing on their asylum claim before an immigration judge. The
INS, however, did not adopt unifrom procedures for exclusion
and deportation proceedings until 1978, and since no Haitians
who had been released in 1977 could be called in for hearings for
more than a year, a backlog of 5000 cases developed. In the
meantime, the INS regional office in Florida mistakenly broadcast the message that all Haitians, rather than just those in the
asylum process, were entitled to work authorizations. As a

consequence, 3000 additional Haitians suddenly appeared and
registered, thus identifying themselves for the first time to INS

officials.
IThis backlog was exacerbated by several additional developments that directly affected the flow of Haitians to the U.S. In

1978, the government of the Bahamas began'to arrest and deport

the Haitians illegally living in the country. Rather than risk
deportation back to Haiti, Haitians began to flock in large
numbers to Florida. In addition, the brief liberalized policies of
the INS, and especially the availability of work authorizations,
acted as a magnet for further migration. In addition, Caribbean
smugglers with the aid of local Haitian officials had stepped up
their activities and were transporting large boat loads of Haitians
to the U. S. Finally, the concentration of Haitians in a few
counties in southern Florida strained local social and health care

service resources. This impact, when combined with resentment
to the granting of work authorizations for Haitians, caused some
backlash in Florida (Copeland and Fagen, 1982).
The INS responded to the dramatic increase in the number of
Haitians arriving in south Florida and the backlog of asylum
cases by cancelling the work authorizations, resuming the

detention of Haitian males and expediting deportation hearings.
The number of hearings increased from an average of 5 to 15 per
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day in early 1978 to 100 to 150 a day by September 1978, with no
more than 5 immigration judges hearing them. The few lawyers
representing the Haitians often were scheduled to represent
several clients whose hearings occurred simultaneously. Attorneys were not allowed to speak on behalf of their clients, but
Haitians who attempted to speak for themselves were often

provided with inadequate translations or none at all. Following
the initiation of the expedited procedure, the percentage of
asylum claims denials and the numbers of Haitians being

deported increased substantially (Lawyers Committee, 1978;
Copeland and Fagen, 1982).
Resort to the Courts

Advocates of refugee rights maintained that INS practices
undermined due process guarantees and sanctioned a pattern of

discriminatory treatment toward asylum seekers from Haiti.
Lawyers for the Haitians also insisted that Haitians, if returned
home, would be subject to persecution.

Several lawsuits were filed on behalf of the Haitians during
1979, temporarily blocking INS deportation proceedings. In
National Council of Churches v. INS, the plaintiffs asked for the
names of all Haitians who had been returned to Haiti in order to
be able to follow up on these names and possibly prove individual

persecution. Partly in response to this lawsuit, the State Department sent a study team to Haiti in May 1979 to investigate charges
that Haitian refugees were being persecuted upon their return.
The study team reported that it had found no evidence of such

persecution (U. S. State Department, 1979; Hooper, 1980). In
Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, a class action suit, some 4000
Haitians challenged the INS mass deportation policies, and in

National Council of Churches v. Egan the plaintiffs charged that

the INS, in revoking work authorizations for the Haitians as part
of its expedited processing, was not following the Administrative
Procedures Act (Copeland and Fagen, 1982; Zucker, 1983).
In nearly every instance, the courts found for the plaintiffs. The

most significant case was the Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti
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in 1980. Although his decision was based on narrower legal
grounds, Judge James Lawrence King used his opinion to refute
the government's argument that all Haitians were economic
migrants. He found that "much of Haiti's poverty is a result of
Duvalier's efforts to maintain power." "The Haitians' economic
situation," King argued, "is a political condition." He also
discounted the report of the State Department Study Team on
Haitian Returnees (1979) as inadequate proof for the official
contention that Haitians were not persecuted upon return.
Most importantly, however, Judge King found that, under the

accelerated process, Haitian applicants were not given sufficient
time to prepare their asylum applications, to obtain adequate

assistance of counsel, or to state their case before an INS hearing
office. The federal court decision in the the case of Haitian
Refugee Center v. Civiletti concluded:
Those Haitians who came to the United States seeking freedom

and justice did not find it. Instead, they were confronted with an
Immigration and Naturalization Service determined to deport
them. The decision was made among high INS officials to expel
Haitians, despite whatever claims to asylum individual Haitians
might have. A Program was set up to accomplish this goal. The
Program resulted in wholesale violations fo due process and only
Haitians were affected.

This Program, in its planning and executing, is offensive to every
notion of constitutional due process and equal protection. The
Haitians whose claims for asylum were rejected during the
Program shall not be deported until they are given a fair chance to
present their claims for political asylum.

Mass Asylum and Human Rights
Judge King's decision was handed down in July 1980, in the

midst of a mass first asylum crisis for the U. S. during which some
125,000 Cubans and over 11,000 Haitians arrived on American
shores. The flow of Haitians had increased dramatically in mid

1979, reaching its highest level in March and April 1980, just as
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10,000 Cuban asylum-seekers arrived in the Peruvian Embassy in
Havana. INS officials attributed this increase to the court order
that prevented further deportation of Haitians (U.S. Congress,

Select Commission, 1980: 18). This may well have been a factor.
Yet it was hardly the only one. Simultaneous with this increased
flow of Haitians to the U.S. was a rapid deterioration in the

human rights situation in Haiti. Following the February 1979
elections for the National Assembly, arbitrary detentions, torture,
and harassment by the police and the tonton macoutes increased.
The two political parties founded in 1979 by Sylvio Claude and

Gregoire Eugene were both forced to suspend their activities and
their leaders were arrested. A meeting of the Haitian Human
Rights League was broken up by men armed with clubs, and its
president and some 200 visitors, including a representative from
the U.S. Embassy, sustained injuries (Hooper, 1980: 29-32;
Amnesty, 1980; U.S. State Department, 1980a: 77-78; Stepick,

1982).8 The militia, a successor to Francois Duvalier's notorious
tonton macoutes, assumed a more prominent role, and a new
cabinet, installed in November 1979, contained a number of
individuals identified as hard liners and formerly associated with
Francois Duvalier. A report on human rights in Haiti by the State
Department released on February 5, 1980, stated: "There were no

institutional changes favoring political liberalization, however,
and if anything, the ability of Haitian citizens to express political
views declined in 1979" (U.S. State Department, 1980b: 344).
Between October and December 1980, a new wave of arrests took

place. Virtually all Haitian human rights activists, most independent journalists and many lawyers active in the defense of

political detainees and opposition leaders, were arrested or
expelled from the country, putting an end to the already limited
rights to freedom of assembly and expression (Lawyers Committee, 1983).
Despite this rapid deterioration of human rights in Haiti, the

INS and State Department continued to regard Haitians exclusively as economic migrants, rather than as individuals

threatened with persecution. They did so even though the
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adoption of a new Refugee Act of 1980 clearly committed the
United States to adhere to international legal standards and made
asylum (or its statutory equivalent) available as a matter of right
rather than discretion to any individual demonstrating that he or
she was in fact a refugee. According to the INS Deputy District
Director in Miami:
What we're up against from our viewpoint is people who are
fleeing an economic sitution-poverty, -low pay and lack of
employment-coming here trying to better their way of life.
Along the way their cause has been championed by attorneys,

realizing that a claim to political asylum can delay things
indeterminately.

We depend on the State Department to advise us if political
persecution is going on. From what we have received from the
State Department, there is no political persecution in Haiti

[Leapman, 1980].

The State Department view, according to the report of the U.S.
Coordinator of Refugee Affairs to Congress in April 1980, was
that all Haitians entering the United States came as economic
migrants rather than political refugees (Congressional Record,
1980b; 53961). This view was further elaborated and modified
somewhat by Stephen E. Palmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs;
Determination of a particular asylum claim is not a general
referendum of human rights in the home country .... Instead, we
must apply a narrow and clearly focused standard established by
treaty and by US statutes. The question in passing on an asylum

application is this: Does this particular individual have a "wellfounded fear of persecution" based on race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group or political opinion if he
or she were to return to the home country? [U.S. Congress, House,

1980: 207; Rivera, 1980: 300]
Thus,
Most of the applications we receive from Haitian nationals base
the asylum claim solely on the fact that the applicants have
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departed from Haiti illegally. They assert that mere departure and
the seeking of refuge in the United States will be treated as a
political act by the Government of Haiti and that that government
will persecute them if they are returned. Most applications contain
no allegation that the applicants or their families suffered
persecution before they left or that other factors in their background would make them suspect politically in Haiti. We do not
believe that such applications support a finding of a well-founded
fear of persecution, and in such cases we recommend denial of the
application [U.S. Congress, House, 1980: 210].

Despite the official U.S. view of arriving Haitians, events

transpired in the spring of 1980 to force a new Haitian admissions
policy. The combined impact of the Cuban boat lift from Mariel
harbor, peaking in May and June, and the increased flow of
Haitians during the spring of 1980 created a difficult situation

nationally and especially in Florida. A number of interest groups

humanitarian organizations, including the Congressional Black
Caucus, complained bitterly about a system that rendered the
asylum process for Cubans a mere formality, while using it as a

barrier to exclude virtually every Haitian. The passage of the new

refugee act in March, by removing all reference to Communism

from the refugee definition law, destroyed the legal argument for
preferring the former group from the latter. The Cuban-Haitian
comparison sharpened political pressure and gave added force to
a campaign, underway for months, calling for executive action to

allow all Haitian asylum applicants then present in the U.S. to
remain.

President Carter for political reasons chose not to classify the

Haitians and new Cuban arrivals as statutory refugees (Congres-

sional Record, 1980a: 56436-56437).9 However, in the face of
rising national public resentment against both Cubans and
Haitians and a local crisis situation in Florida that required an

immediate federal response, the Carter administration felt compelled to come up with a politically acceptable solution to the
1980 mass asylum crisis. On June 20, 1980, President Carter
issued a declaration establishing the new status of "CubanHaitian entrant" that effectively paroled into the U.S. the

Haitians and Cubans involved in INS proceedings prior to June
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19, 1980 (later extended to October 10, 1980). This new classifica-

tion allowed the entrants to remain in the U.S. Initially, the
government reimbursed the states for only 75% of certain social
service and medical expenses and refused to fund the usual range

of benefits made available to refugees in the U.S. In response to
what was perceived as neglect of local impact on the part of the

federal government, the Florida congressional delegation pressed

through the Fascell-Stone Amendment to the Refugee Education
Assistance Act which forced the federal government to grant
entrant benefits equal to those of a refugee and to provide 100%
reimbursement of state and local costs.

The Reagan Administration and

the Politics of Restriction
A shift in domestic political concerns and the intensification of

Cold War politics in the entire Caribbean Basin after the 1980
election marked the end of the reluctant liberalization of Haitian
admissions policy that accompanied the Mariel boat lift. Responding to rising domestic unemployment, burgeoning budget deficits,
and the local impact of the more than 400,000 refugees streaming
into the U.S. during 1980, Congress became increasingly restrictive and began to push for new immigration legislation. Nevertheless, the influx of Haitians into the U.S. continued, and those who
arrived after the October 10, 1980, cutoff date for Cuban-Haitian

entrant status, were subject to exclusion. Since December 1980,
the INS has been permitted to resume exclusion hearings for
Haitians.
Thus, the Reagan administration has intensified measures

designed to curb refugee admissions. While continuing to admit a

significant although decreasing-number of refugees making
application from Indochina and Eastern Europe, it is taking
concerted steps to discourage asylum-seekers from Latin America
and the Caribbean from entering the U.S. The Haitians, along

with Salvadorans, have borne the brunt of the new restrictive
attitude and have been subjected to especially harsh treatment. In
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FY 1981, for example, 503 Haitians applied for asylum and 5 were
granted it. During the same year, only 2 Salvadorans out of 5,570
applicants were granted political asylum in the U.S. Haitians
have again been subjected to mass exclusion hearings and were
the first group of asylum-seekers to be detained. Furthermore, the
Haitians have been the only group interdicted at sea and returned
home.

By mid 1981, most aspects of the Haitian program were set in
place. In May, the Reagan administration began detaining

without the possibility of bond all Haitians subject to exclusion.
In June, the INS resumed mass exclusion hearings, often in
closed-door courtrooms from which attorneys were barred, and

all Haitians applying for work authorizations were arrested by
the INS (Zucker, 1983). When protests from the Congressional
Black Caucus and others brought these practices to a halt, the

INS adopted a policy of routinely detaining all arriving Haitians
in substandard facilities, sending some to the coldest or the most
remote parts of the United States and others to Puerto Rico

(Hooper and Murphy, 1983).1o In these camps, Haitians were
often denied access to legal counsel, were subjected to harassment, and rushed throughproforma asylum hearings.
In September 1981, the U.S. initiated a program that sought to

circumvent the courts altogether. President Reagan signed an

Executive Order authorizing the U.S. Coast Guard to intercept
vessels believed to be transporting Haitians who intended to enter

the U.S. illegally and to return them to Port-au-Prince (U.S.

GAO Report, 1983). A Haitian Navy liaison officer was assigned
to the Coast Guard cutter on station, and the U.S. promised to
help train and provide the Haitian Navy and Army with the
means to patrol their coastline in order to prevent their countrymen from leaving. At the same time, Congress adopted legislation,
the Fascell-Mica-Chiles Amendment (Section 721) to the Interna-

tional Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981,
linking Haitian cooperation in stopping illegal emigration,
implementing development programs, and respecting its citizens'
human rights to the release of U.S. foreign assistance funds to
Haiti. By October 1981, the first Coast Guard cutter was plying
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Haitian waters. Aboard was an INS officer who, in proceedings
termed "walrus courts" by The New York Times, (New York
Times, 1981) heard the claims of Haitians who alleged political
persecution and returned them to Haitian authorities.

The second major aspect of the Reagan program to deal withthe Haitians involved the submission to Congress of the Administra-

tion's 1981 Omnibus Immigration Control Act. This legislative
package proposed, among other things, greater autonomy for the

INS in determining when' an applicant's fear of persecution is
justified, and would have deprived the federal courts of any
oversight over that determination. In addition to limiting judicial

review, the Reagan proposals provided for detention, the restriction of the role of counsel, and authorization in law of interdiction
of foreign vessels on the high seas suspected of smuggling aliens,
even in the absence of consent from their country of origin.
Although Congress submitted its own immigration proposal in
the form of the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill, the thrust of U.S.
remains-to prevent asylum-seekers from reaching the borders of
the United States, to detain under misearable conditions those
who do manage to reach those borders, and to expedite the latter
group's return.

Undoubtedly, the policy to discourage the granting of asylum
has been predicated primarily on a broader commitment to
immigration control, and to fears that large numbers of Caribbean Basin nationals will continue to enter the United States
illegally, using the asylum process to avoid exclusion or deportation. Yet, Cubans continue to receive favorable treatment. In

February 1984, the White House was reported to be offering

permanent residence status to the 125,000 Mariel Cubans but not
to the 7,200 Haitians who also arrived in 1980, and corrective
legislation needed to be introduced by Peter Rodino, Chairman

of the House Judiciary Committee (New York Times, 1984a).
Current refugee and asylum policy is also the result of
ideological priorities of the Reagan administration. It is not a
coincidence that Poles but not Haitians have been granted

extended voluntary departure status. Administration officials
have asserted that it is in the national interest to support
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authoritarian allies in order to contain totalitarian adversaries. In
June 1982, Elliot Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, relied implicitly on the
authoritarian/totalitarian distinction to explain why Cubans are
refugees and should continue to be welcome in the United States
while Haitians should be turned away at the border or interdicted
at sea (Abrams, 1982: 43-45).

Root Causes and Haitian Emigration
An asylum policy that proceeds from preconceived ideological

biases and seeks to control immigration flow without looking into
underlying causes is shortsighted. In the long run the only
effective way of reducing the flow of Haitians to the U.S. is to
address concretely the conditions that create refugees (Scanlan
and Loescher, 1982: 39-56). During the Reagan administration,

violations of human rights under Jean-Claude Duvalier-have

continued unabated and have been documented by numerous
human rights organizations (Gastil, 1982; OAS, 1983; Amnesty,
1981; and 1982; Lawyers Committee, 1983). In fact, the human

rights record of Haiti is regarded by Freedom House in New York
as even worse than Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba (Gastil, 1982:
282, 299).

Despite Haiti's abysmal record, the prospects for a forceful
human rights policy under the Reagan administration seem
rather poor. Toward Latin America and the Caribbean, Reagan

is motivated by his intention to defend the security interests of the
U.S. and by expression of concern about the Marxist threat in

Nicaragua and El Salvador, and, in particular, by Cuba's efforts
to export revolution in the region. This has resulted, among other

things, in the U.S. resuming a policy of nearly unrestricted arms
sales to governments in the area regardless of their human rights
violations. In order to carry out this policy, the U.S. State
Department has had to underplay the extent of human rights
violations among its aid recipients (Hooper, 1981; Americas
Watch, 1982; 1983).1" In regard to Haiti, human rights reporting
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has played down human rights abuses in order to certify Haiti
for more U.S. aid and to justify the State Department/INS
position that hardly any Haitians are worthy of political asylum
(U.S. Department of State, 1982; New York Times, 1984b).'2
U.S. policy toward Haiti under Reagan is based on the

maintenance of friendly relations with the noncommunist Duvalier government. To this end, the U.S. has encouraged increases
in foreign economic aid from multilateral and bilateral sources.
The U.S. has, for example, intervened on behalf of Haiti with the

international financial institutions and with other bilateral donors
to obtain further economic assistance for Haiti. International

assistance has been granted by the World Bank, the United
Nations Development Program, the Inter-American Develop-

ment Bank, the Organization of American States, and the
International Monetary Fund. U.S. bilateral assistance to Haiti,
totalled $34 million in FY1981, $37 million in FY1982, and is
programmed for $38.8 million for FY1983 (McPherson, 1982).
Most of the PL 480 food grants and some development projects
are channeled through private voluntary agencies, including

CARE, Catholic Relief Services, and Church World Service. The
personnel of most major aid programs, including those administered by the voluntary agencies, complain of governmental

corruption and significant diversion of aid.
A major purpose of the recent increases in the U.S. aid
program is to bring the problem of Haitian emigration under

control. Based on the assumption that most Haitians emigrate to
find jobs, AID and other external donors have argued that the

Haitian economy has to provide more employment and make life
more bearable in the rural areas in order to reduce the pressures to
emigrate. According to McPherson:
The pressure to migrate will continue as long as the countryside

lacks employment opportunities and even the most rudimentary
services in health, education and public services. Job creation,
therefore, must continue to be one of the economy's prime aims
[McPherson, 1982].

The success of this or any other development program in Haiti,
however, is dependent on the ability of the U.S. in concert with
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other bilateral and multilateral donors and the Haitian govern-

ment, to come to grips with the problems of incompetence, self-

interest, and corruption currently rife in Haitian society. To date,
development efforts in Haiti have been singularly unsuccessful
due to pervasive governmental corruption and insensitivity to the
plight of the average Haitian (Lundahl, 1979; Miami Herald,
1982). According to a 1982 report of the General Accounting
Office, the AID program objectives of strengthening the Haitian

government's commitment to equitable economic and social

development programs have had only "limited ability to impact
on Haiti's dire poverty, and many projects have had less than

satisfactory results" (U.S. GAO Report, 1982: 6)13 The report
further states that "AID's current program will not likely result in
a fundamental turnaround to Haiti's dire economic condition,

nor will it substantially alter the economic factors encouraging
emigration" (U.S. GAO Report, 1982).
Rather, the continued neglect of the rural areas suggests that
pressures for the displacement of peasants from the countryside

will intensify and that large-scale rural-urban migration may be
the result. These pressures will, in turn, be exacerbated by the
Reagan administration's temporarily successful efforts to curb

illegal Haitian emigration to the U.S. The danger is that the
closing of Haiti's traditional "safety valve" of out-migration may
well result in increased immigration to Port-au-Prince, which is
already overcrowded and cannot respond to a massive influx of
more people. Thus, the probability of internal political unrest,
persecution, and more out-migration in spite of enforcement
efforts is great, and the U.S. should be prepared for a possible
mass asylum crisis involving Haitians in the future.
To date, U.S. admissions practices toward asylum applicants
from Haiti have been influenced by political conditions having
much to do with foreign relations and fears of uncontrolled illegal
immigration and little to do with probable persecution, considerations of humanity, and due process. Haiti is still regarded as a
defender of U.S. interests in the region. Yet political support for
repressive and unpopular regimes is bad foreign policy, since such
regimes are inherently less stable and inevitably produce large
numbers of refugees. There are no easy solutions to the problems
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plaguing Haiti. Nor are there easy solutions to economic
pressures driving people from every country in the region toward
the U.S. Yet a government less corrupt than the present Haitian

regime, and one that addressed the roots of rural poverty and
respected human rights, would be better able to curb the massive
outflow of Haitians to the U.S. The U.S. is in a position to exert
leverage on the Duvalier regime for considerable improvement in
its human rights practices and financial accountability for aid.
Haiti is in a desperate economic situation and will continue to rely

on large infusions of external aid for the foreseeable future. It is
essential that aid be directed to basic needs and focus on the

peasants, which is not the case at present.
At the same time, in confronting the myriad problems posed by

mass asylum, the United States should not lose sight of the fact
that political asylum was created for humanitarian reasons to
help carefully defined groups. It may be that a substantial number

of Haitians are not refugees under the international standard set
out in the Refugee Act of 1980. Many of the Haitians, however,
will be bonafide refugees. If the United States is serious about

human rights in Haiti, it must be willing to offer the hope of
protection for those Haitians with the courage to begin the

democratization process there. The U.S. must not let its legitimate
concern for controlling its borders interfere with its obligation to
let those who are refugees into the country. The means should be
developed to make the U.S. asylum system more efficient within
the context of international and constitutional obligations and

constitutional obligations and American humanitarian ideals,
and to ensure that it does not prevent or circumvent the process
altogether for political reasons.

NOTES
1. U.S. AID describes the role of the Haitian government as follows:

Throughout much of Haiti's history, "government" has been a prize to capture,
with the victor gaining the spoils in terms of appointing friends and relatives to the

payroll and using government positions for private profit ... Haiti does not have a
tradition of government as a servant of the people.
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2. The background on the legal status and programs for Cubans is given in Moore

(1980).
3. In a letter to President Eisenhower on October 8, 1959, Duvalier concluded:

Last week, I was advised by the Charge d'Affairs ad Interim that "although the
United States has concluded there is no present or anticipated requirement for a

permanent military installation in Haiti, it would be useful to have access to sites
suitable for amphibious training."

I can say without reservation that any sites required by the United States for
amphibious training will be made available immediately. Also, if United States

military survey teams will be sent to Haiti for determining the locations for such

sites, they will have placed at their disposal all of the information, facilities and
assistance that they may require.
In view of the continual worsening of conditions throughout the world, my offer to
the United States of American concerning the availability of sites for military or
missile installations, as well as for missile tracking stations remains unchanged.

Mr. President, you have my best wishes for continued success in your enormous
task of maintaining world peace. I wish to assure you again that, in the United
Nations, the Republic of Haiti will continue to vote with and support the policies of
the United States of America.

4. The chiefs of the U.S. military missions in Haiti were present at the inauguration
ceremonies, however, and sitting in Port-au-Prince harbor was a U.S. ship bearing arms
for the Haitian army.
5. It was reported in the New York Times that the CIA (Central Intelligency Agency)

"collaborated with Haitian leaders of a group of at least 200 rebels" who tried
unsuccessfully to overthrow Duvalier in 1963 (1975b).
6. The International Rescue Committee reported that although diplomatic relations

between Haiti and the Domincian Republic had been severed in April 1963 about 5000
persons had escaped from Haiti to the Dominican Republic between May and December
1983.

7. According to one authority, "This fact of security also affects the peasant freehold
farmers who rarely have clear title. There are substantiated reports of land grabs, of judges
bribed to issue competing land titles, and of extortion by locally powerful quasigovernmental authorities. Facing the very real possibility of appropriation of their land by
gross neg (big shots), farmers are also discouraged from investing in their land and
encouraged to overwork it" (Maguire, 1981).
8. Apparently the Haitian government has never conducted an inquiry into this
incident, and no one has been charged with any crimes in connection with the violent
actions of these security forces.
9. Such a course had been recommended by Senator Edward Kennedy, Carter's
principal opponent for the 1980 Democratic nomination, in a 20 May, 1980 letter to
President Carter.

10. Although federal efforts to establish illegal alien detention centers at Fort Drum,

New York, and Glasgow, Montana, were deferred under widespread criticism, as of
March 1982 over 250 Haitians were detained at northern sites run by the Bureau of Prisons
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in Otisville and Raybrook, New York, and 778 were at Fort Allen, Puerto Rico (U.S. INS
Statistical Report, 1982).

11. This report concluded that the State Department distorted its human righs
reporting for foreign policy reasons. It reads, in part:

Though most of the work in compiling the Country Reports has been carried on
responsibly and effectively by the Department-of State, political biases are evident

in some of the reports. There is no general overstatement of human rights abuses in
countries with which United States relations are not friendly. Nor is there any
general understatement of abuses in countries friendly to the United States.

Rather, distortions in the reporting seem to reflect efforts to further political ends
relating to the particular countries.

Among the most serious distortions we noted are contained in the reports of El
Salvador and Haiti.

In the case of El Salvador, ... (in) an apparent effort to make certain that the
Country Reports do not undermine the Reagan administration's program of

providing military aid to El Salvador ... the Country Reports systematically
attempts to absolve the government of El Salvador and the high command of the

military of responsibility for abuses of human rights committed by the security
forces.

In the case of Haiti, the report . . . grossly understates the seriousness of human
rights abuses, apparently in an effort to undercut claims for asylum by Haitian
refugees in the United States.
12. The State Department has been required by Section 721 of the International

Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 to report on human rights conditions
in Haiti on an annual basis. Since 1982, it has reported that the Haitian Government is not
engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights.

13. The most obvious examples of the Haitian government's insensitivity to the fate of

its own citizens has been the uncooperative response it gave to two recent AID (Agency for
International Development) programs targeted for human rights and' basic needs.

According to the GAO (U.S. Government Accounting Office) report (1982):

The project for legal assistance to the poor was to begin in 1979. The primary
purpose was to assist the Port-au-Prince Bar Association in establishing a system
for free legal services to indigent Haitians accused of crimes. A secondary purpose
was to strengthen the Bar Association by supporting its role as a trainer of new
lawyers. Haitian support for this project never materialized. AID deobligated this
project before the end of the fiscal year 1981. The project for agricultural research

was to begin in 1978. The purpose of this project was to establish in the Ministry of
Agriculture the institutional ability to conduct agricultural research and statistics

surveys to support the Haitian small farmer agricultural/rural development
program. As of October 1981 the project still had not begun. The Haiti AID
Mission Director is now reprogramming the project with the Ministry and expects
to initiate activities by June 1982. If progress is not satisfactory by then, he plans to

deobligate the project before the end of fiscal year 1982.
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